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TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT: MONSANTO V. MCFARLING, BOWERS V.
BAYSTATE TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
FORMALISTIC APPROACH TO CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
CHRISTOPHER M. KAISER*
INTRODUCTION
Adhesion contracts1 in their various forms are extremely common,
comprising the vast majority of all contracts made. 2 Contracts of adhesion,
including form contracts 3 and shrinkwrap license agreements, 4 are an im-
portant part of the modem consumer economy. By greatly reducing trans-
action costs, these contracts help to lubricate the gears of the market, at
least when standardized products are offered for sale, as is the case with
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2005; B.S.,
Chemical Engineering, Colorado School of Mines, 1996. The author would like to thank Professor
Timothy Holbrook for his insightful comments on the various drafts of this Note.
1. A precise definition of "adhesion contract" or "contract of adhesion"--terms used inter-
changeably-is nearly impossible, since courts do not agree to a large degree on what such a contract
entails. However, the term here is used to refer to a contract for sale of a good or service that is offered
on a "take it or leave it" basis, where the purchaser either buys the product and accepts the offered
terms of sale (which may or may not be written down) or refuses the terms of sale and thereby forgoes
the sale altogether. It should be noted that the term "contract of adhesion" tends to have a somewhat
negative connotation, suggesting that the contract might be unconscionable. However, most courts take
pains to state that adhesion contracts are not necessarily unconscionable and that unconscionable con-
tracts are not necessarily adhesive-it could hardly be otherwise, given the large degree to which
contracts of adhesion dominate the modem consumer economy. See infra note 2.
2. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power,
84 HARV. L REv. 529, 529 (1971). Slawson notes that "[p]arking lot and theater tickets, package
receipts, department store charge slips, and gas station credit card purchase slips are all standard form
contracts," as are many contracts pertaining to "insurance, leases, deeds, mortgages, automobile pur-
chases, and all of the various forms of consumer credit." Id. He believes that adhesion contracts "proba-
bly account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made." Id.
3. For a very complete discussion of the use of form contracts to replace market transactions in
the modem business environment, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruc-
tion, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1174, 1220-25 (1983).
4. A discussion of shrinkwrap license agreements can be found in Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239 (1995). As he notes, they are typically
found in the context of software purchases, where the consumer accepts the terms of the agreement
simply by opening the package in which the software is shipped and marketed. Id. at 1241-42.
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most goods and services sold today. 5 They also allow the party who drafts
the contract to "rationally calculate the costs and risks of performance. ' 6
Thanks to these benefits, many consumers "have difficulty remembering
the last time they contracted other than by standard form." 7 Most routine
transactions are accomplished through contracts of adhesion, and standard
forms are even used for transactions consumers engage in less frequently,
such as those involving or for the sale of cars, insurance, and even real
property.8
All this benefit comes at a cost, though. While both parties experience
the benefit of lowered transaction costs inherent in the use of form con-
tracts and other contracts of adhesion,9 the benefit of the increased ability
to "calculate the costs and risks of performance"' 0 is only felt by the party
who drafts the contract. The party who adheres to the contract-who must
take the offered terms or forgo the transaction! l-gives up much, possibly
all, of the bargaining power she is assumed to have under the traditional
model of contract formation. 12 Many people adhere to such contracts with-
out reading or understanding the terms to which they consent, even when
they take the time to shop around for a good bargain. 13 Thus, although
contracts of adhesion are generally considered enforceable, courts have
begun to treat them differently from traditional contracts, at least under
some circumstances. 14
5. 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (rev. ed.
1993).
6. Id.
7. Slawson, supra note 2, at 529.
8. Id.
9. Form contracts lower transaction costs by forcing a "take it or leave it" model on consumers,
freeing buyers and sellers from haggling over the terms and conditions of each individual purchase.
Lower transaction costs are presumably passed on to adherents to form contracts in the form of lower
prices, benefiting the adherents. In addition, sellers can include terms that allow them to produce or sell
their goods more cheaply, or both, passing on the savings to buyers, as recognized by the Supreme
Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute. 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (noting that a forum selection
clause included in a standard-form cruise passenger ticket benefited passengers "in the form of reduced
fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued").
10. CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 5, § 1.4.
11. Rakoff, supra note 3, at 1225.
12. See Slawson, supra note 2, at 529 ("The contracting still imagined by courts and law teachers
as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire agreement, is no
longer of much more than historical importance.").
13. Rakoff, supra note 3, at 1226 ("The ideal adherent who would read, understand, and compare
several forms is unheard of in the legal literature and, I warrant, in life as well.").
14. Id. at 1174-75 ("Some judges.., have broadly declared that contracts of adhesion are spe-
cial." (citing Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 135 n.1 1 (4th Cir. 1967); C & J
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 NW.2d 169, 173-74 (Iowa 1975) (en bane); Estrin Constr.
Co. v. Aema Casualty & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 422-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); College Mobile
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Despite their relative abundance, contracts of adhesion have rarely
been at issue in cases before the Federal Circuit, probably due to the spe-
cialized nature of the Federal Circuit's subject-matter jurisdiction, which
largely deals with patent law and other federal claims. However, two cases
dealing with contracts of adhesion were decided by the Federal Circuit in
late 2002 and early 2003. The two cases were Monsanto Co. v. McFar-
lingl5 and Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.16 In both cases, the court
enforced the contracts at issue, even though both contracts were at odds
with important public policies and both contracts were clearly adhesive.' 7
These decisions and their rationales suggest that the Federal Circuit
strongly favors enforcing contracts, possibly to the exclusion of other
considerations.
This sort of bright-line rule is a symptom of overly formalistic analy-
sis.18 Of course, criticism of the Federal Circuit for being overly formalistic
is far from novel.' 9 Nonetheless, this Note will examine the overly formal-
istic ways in which the Federal Circuit decides cases dealing with contracts
of adhesion-a new subject to which the Federal Circuit has applied its
overly formalistic approach, leading to greater predictability but reducing
the ability of the court to take into account many relevant factors 20-and
will recommend a factor-based test to be used instead. Part I will examine
the principles courts generally employ for deciding when contracts of adhe-
sion should be enforced. Part II will review the background of the two re-
cent Federal Circuit cases, Bowers and Monsanto. Part III will look to the
Home Park & Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 241 N.W.2d 174, 176-78 (Wis. 1976))). See also infra notes
21-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of some cases where courts have treated contracts of
adhesion differently from other types of contracts.
15. 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert- denied, 537 U.S. 1232, 123 S. Ct. 1357 (2003).
16. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 928, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003).
17. Monsanto dealt with the adherent's agreeing to be sued in a court that could not, in the ab-
sence of the contract, exercise personal jurisdiction over him. The contract in Bowers was a shrinkwrap
license agreement under which the adherent agreed not to engage in reverse engineering of software,
behavior allowed in the fair use provision of the copyright statute, 17 U.S.C § 107 (2000). See infra
notes 35-85 and 102-04, and accompanying text.
18. The term "formalistic" refers to the preference for bright-line, somewhat simplistic rules.
19. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court's Complicity in Federal Circuit Formal-
ism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2003); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the
Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 771 (2003). Professor Thomas suggests that "[w]here the Federal
Circuit once resolved issues based upon 'all the facts and circumstances,' it now more often applies a
discrete list of factors." Thomas, supra, at 773 (citing Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998)).
20. As many critics have noted, the use of such formal rules for judicial decision making increases
the level of certainty in a given holding, but this often comes at the cost of reduced fairness. See, e.g.,
Holbrook, supra note 19, at 1. As Professor Holbrook notes, Donald Chisum went so far as to label the
tension between certainty and fairness a "conundrum." Id (citing Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of
Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection-
Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1998)).
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public policies courts seek to enforce when deciding issues of intellectual
property law. Part IV will develop a list of factors for courts to consider
when dealing with intellectual property cases in which contracts of adhe-
sion are at issue. Part V will apply these factors to Bowers and Monsanto in
order to demonstrate the differences between the Federal Circuit's overly
formalistic approach and the recommended factor-based approach that
resolves the fairness concerns inherent in the Federal Circuit's current ap-
proach. Finally, Part VI will discuss some of the ramifications of adopting
the recommended factor-based approach to deciding whether to enforce
questionable provisions of contracts of adhesion.
I. PRINCIPLES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED TO DECIDE VALIDITY OF
CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
Generally, standardized form contracts are considered valid without
some showing of substantive (and substantial) unfairness to the adhering
party.21 However, courts have recognized that, at least under some circum-
stances, contracts of adhesion warrant closer judicial scrutiny than con-
tracts more closely conforming to the traditional model of mutual assent
and bargaining over terms.
For example, the Iowa Supreme Court held in 1975 that, for cases
dealing with form insurance policies, legal rules designed to deal with more
traditional contracts could not simply be applied without any further analy-
sis because the rules broke down in the context of "ready-made applica-
tions and... ready-made policies carefully concocted to conserve the
interests of the company. ' '22
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted in an insurance
case that "[c]ourts ... have grown increasingly sensitive to imposition,
conscious or otherwise, on members of the public by persons with whom
they deal, who [by various means] have acquired such expertise or mo-
nopolistic or practical control in the business transaction involved as to
give them an undue advantage. ' 23
21. Rakoff, supra note 3, at 1190 ("[A] signed document is, as an initial matter, a binding con-
tract, and.., cause must be shown in order to support nonenforcement of a term."); see also Monsanto
Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Clevenger, J., dissenting) ("[T]he commercial
terms of adhesion contracts are generally enforceable absent a showing of substantive unconscionabil-
ity."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1232, 123 S. Ct. 1357 (2003).
22. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 173-74 (Iowa 1975) (en bane)
(citation omitted).
23. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967).
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The Supreme Court of Indiana has held that the old rule that "an
agreement or contract, signed by the parties, is conclusively presumed to
represent... a meeting of the minds" no longer applies to preprinted form
contracts.24 The party who drafted the form has the burden "to show that
the other party had knowledge of any unusual... terms contained
therein." 25
What all these cases have in common is an interest in fairness over the
application of mechanical rules. Whether the courts look with a more ques-
tioning eye on standardized forms, more closely scrutinize contracts drafted
by those with a greater business advantage, or shift the burden of proving
contract validity to the party drafting the contract, they all are attempting to
take into account "the equities of the case."'26
The United States Supreme Court, too, has engaged in deeper analysis
of form contracts than might have been the case had the Court been dealing
with a freely-negotiated instrument. In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute,27 the Court considered a forum selection clause in a standard form
contract, which in this case took the form of a cruise passenger ticket.28 In
upholding the clause, the Court disagreed with a lower court finding that
nonnegotiated forum selection clauses in form contracts could never be
valid.29 However, the mere presence of an agreed-upon contract, given that
the contract was a standard form, was not sufficient in itself to find the
clause enforceable. 30 The Supreme Court engaged in a factor-based analy-
sis to decide whether the forum selection clause was enforceable; among
the factors arguing in favor of enforcing the form contract were (1) a le-
gitimate interest on the part of the cruise line "in limiting the fora" in which
it could be sued, (2) an interest on the part of both parties to the agreement
in reducing the cost of litigation by "dispelling any confusion about where"
suit may be brought, and (3) the fact that lower litigation costs were passed
on to passengers in the form of lower ticket prices.31 As with the state cases
above, the Supreme Court seems to be interested in balancing the equities,
rather than in mechanically applying rules of contract law in cases in which
form contracts are at issue. Here, the contract terms were reasonable and
24. Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971) (emphasis in original).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 148.
27. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
28. ld. at 593-94.
29. Id. at 593.
30. Id. ("[A] reasonable forum clause in a form contract of this kind well may be permissible for
several reasons.").
31. Id. at 593-94.
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resulted in some benefit to both parties, and so the contract was enforced.
However, the enforcement of the contract was less important than the fact
that the Court, like other courts considering form contracts, actually applied
some degree of analysis to the enforcement issue, something the Federal
Circuit has declined to do.
As a final note on judicial treatment of form contracts, the doctrine of
contra proferentum must be taken into account. This doctrine is applied by
courts as a rule of construction when contracts are drafted by one party; the
principle requires any ambiguous terms to be construed against the interests
of the party who drafted the contract. 32 Since this principle applies when
the party who drafts the contract "ha[s] complete control over the language
of its terms [and) offers the reciprocal license on a 'take it or leave it' ba-
sis,''33 it applies to situations where contracts of adhesion are at issue, be-
cause the terms of a contract of adhesion are always drafted by one party.
While contra proferentum is less concerned with fundamental fairness and
equity balancing than with implementing a lowest-cost avoider system, it is
still relevant to courts' consideration of standard form contracts.
1I. MONSANTO AND BOWERS: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CONSIDERS
CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
Prior to August 2002, the Federal Circuit had never decided whether
to enforce a formal, written contract alleged to be adhesive. 34 However,
within a span of less than six months, the court decided two cases dealing
with contracts of adhesion, holding in both instances that the contracts were
enforceable. In August 2002, the court decided Monsanto Co. v. McFar-
ling, a patent law case, while Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., a case
implicating both patent law and copyright law, was decided following a
panel rehearing in January 2003.
32. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs. Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
33. Id.
34. Other than Monsanto and Bowers, the only other case in which the Federal Circuit has ever
used the phrase "contract of adhesion" was Vitacco v. Toastmaster, Inc., Nos. 93-1273, 93-1274, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 2049 (Jan. 31, 1994), an unpublished decision in which the court upheld a district
court's order of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had alleged inter alia that.a contract at issue
was adhesive. The term in this instance was meant to suggest that the contract was both oppressive and
offered in a "take it or leave it" spirit. Id. at *8. Presumably, given the ubiquitous nature of formal and
informal form contracts in the modem consumer economy, the court has considered an adhesive but
informal contract at some point since its formation in 1982.
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A. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling
Monsanto Co. developed genetically engineered soybean seeds that
were resistant to particular herbicides. 35 Use of these soybean seeds re-
duces the labor cost for farmers who need to apply herbicides to their
fields, since the herbicide can be applied broadly, "killing the weeds but
not harming the resistant [soybeans]."' 36 The soybeans, sold under the
Roundup Ready® brand, are covered by United States patents, and they are
therefore only available from Monsanto. 37 Farmers find these seeds more
competitive than ordinary, nongenetically modified seed, to the extent that
nearly two-thirds of soybeans planted in the United States today are
Roundup Ready® seeds.38
Farmers purchase Roundup Ready® soybean seeds through "various
companies [authorized by Monsanto] to manufacture the patented seeds."'39
Monsanto requires the purchasing farmer to pay it a license fee and re-
quires the farmer to sign a "Technology Agreement," a preprinted form
containing the terms of the sale. 40
Among the terms in the Technology Agreement is a forum selection
clause giving exclusive jurisdiction to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, for any dispute arising
under the agreement. 41 Should the farmer violate the terms of the agree-
ment, Monsanto would bring suit in Missouri, Monsanto's home forum,42
against him. This is what happened in Monsanto Co. v. McFarling.
Monsanto filed suit against Homan McFarling, a Mississippi farmer,
for a violation of the term of the Technology Agreement prohibiting the
saving of any soybeans from one year's harvest to plant as seed the next
year.43 The suit was brought in the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division, consistent with the forum selection clause discussed above. 44 The
district court granted a preliminary injunction against McFarling prohibit-
ing him from replanting the seeds he saved from crops grown from Mon-
35. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1232, 123 S. Ct. 1357 (2003).
36. Id.
37. Id.; see U. S. Patent No. 5,633,435 (issued May 27, 1997); U. S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (issued
Oct 4, 1994).
38. Monsanto, 302 F.3d at 1301.
39. Id. at 1293.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1294.
42. Id. at 1295.
43. Id. at 1293.
44. Id. at 1294.
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santo's patented soybean seed.45 McFarling appealed the grant of the pre-
liminary injunction, challenging the personal jurisdiction of the district
court in Missouri.46
The Federal Circuit majority upheld the grant of the injunction, ruling
that the forum selection clause in the contract controlled whether the dis-
trict court had personal jurisdiction. 47 The majority's approach can be best
classified as formalist, as they focused on the fact that McFarling signed
the agreement in question,48 rather than on any balance of the equities or
other relevant factors. They held that McFarling's argument that his "vol-
untary failure to read what he signed" afforded him no protection from
being bound by the terms of the agreement.49 The majority engaged in no
scrutiny of the forum selection clause and simply enforced it as one of
many terms of the contract in question.50 This lack of meaningful analysis
came despite the court's acknowledgement of the Supreme Court's holding
in Carnival Cruise Lines that "forum-selection clauses contained in form
passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental
fairness."51
In contrast to the majority, which made no attempt to evaluate whether
the forum selection clause in the Technology Agreement was reasonable or
appropriate, the dissent argued that "the conclusion that a defendant has
surrendered his right to due process of law is not one that a court should
reach casually."'52 The dissent advocated much more significant analysis
than that engaged in by the majority, adopting considerable portions of the
standard laid out in Carnival Cruise Lines.53 This analysis is especially
warranted when, as here, certain factors come into play: (1) the contractual
provision in question deals with the foregoing of a right so fundamental as
the right to be tried in a court with proper personal jurisdiction,54 (2) the
contract in which the right is allegedly waived is a contract of adhesion, 55
45. Id at 1293.
46. Id. at 1294.
47. Id. at 1296.
48. Id. at 1295.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc, v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991)).
52. Id. at 1300 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1306.
54. Id. at 1300.
55. Id. at 1301-02.
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and (3) the party drafting the contract and the party bringing suit are the
same party. 56
B. Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.
Factually, Bowers v. Baystate is a more complex case than Monsanto
Co. v. McFarling. The case involves claims for breach of contract, patent
infringement, and copyright infringement. 57 All three claims stem from
Harold Bowers's development of a product originally known as Cadjet and
eventually sold as part of a product called the Designer's Toolkit. 58
Bowers developed a template to assist operators of computer-aided
design ("CAD") programs. 59 Typically, when CAD users want to give a
command to their software, they must select it out of nested menus,60
which is somewhat inefficient. 61 Bowers improved the situation by devel-
oping a template to lay on top of a digitizing tablet, allowing "the many
CAD commands [to be presented] in a... logical order."'62 The template
was protected by a patent6 3 and was commercialized as Cadjet.64
Later, an engineer named George W. Ford, III, developed software
that improved Bowers's invention by allowing operators to easily add sym-
bols specifying various parameters "for features of the computer-generated
design. '65 This software was protected by a registered copyright. 66 Since
Ford's and Bowers's products were so closely related, they were eventually
sold together as the Designer's Toolkit.67 This product was sold under a
shrinkwrap license agreement prohibiting reverse engineering of the
software. 68
56. Id. at 1306-07. The dissent refers to this situation as one in which the forum selection clause is
wielded offensively. Id. at 1302.
57. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S.
928, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003).
58. Id. at 1321-22.
59. Id. at 1320.
60. Although the Bowers court does not explain the term "nested menus," the phrase is generally
understood to mean a system where the user is presented with a number of choices (menus), each of
which presents the user with another list of choices (a menu nested within the first menu selection), and
so on, until the user has, in this case, selected the CAD command he needs.
61. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1321.
62. Id.
63. U. S. Patent No. 4,933,514 (issued June 12, 1990).
64. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1321.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1322.
67. Id.
68. Id. "Reverse engineering" refers to "the process by which a completed process is systemati-
cally broken down into its component parts to discover the properties of the product with the goal of
2005]
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Eventually, Baystate Technologies, a competitor of Bowers, pur-
chased a copy of the Designer's Toolkit, 69 reverse engineered it,70 and
incorporated its features into their own competing product, Draft-Pak.
7 1
Baystate sued Bowers for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, and
Bowers counterclaimed for copyright infringement, patent infringement,
and breach of contract. 72 The district court jury found for Bowers, award-
ing damages on all three of his claims, and against Baystate on its claim.
73
The district court judge modified the jury's verdict, finding the copyright
and breach of contract damages duplicative and as a result omitting the
copyright damages. 74
The issue on appeal was whether Bowers's breach of contract claim
was preempted 75 by federal copyright law. 76 Because the copyright in-
fringement claim and the breach of contract claim were based on the same
alleged actions, the contract claim might be preempted by the copyright
statute.77 This would leave only the copyright claim. Further, Baystate
argued it should win on the copyright claim because its alleged actions
constituted reverse engineering, which is allowed under the fair use section
of the Copyright Act.7 8 Bowers argued that the breach of contract claim
gaining the expertise to reproduce the product." Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d
751, 775 n.8 (Iowa 1999). In computer software, this process involves examining the machine-readable
programs to discern the general ideas embodied in them. See Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326 ("[R]everse
engineering... means ordinarily to study or analyze (a device, as a microchip for computers) in order
to learn details of design, construction, and operation, perhaps to produce a copy or an improved ver-
sion." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
69. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1322.
70. Id. at 1326-27.
71. Id. at 1322.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1320.
74. Id.
75. As with many federal statutes, copyright law is intended to provide the sole available remedy
for any violation equivalent to copyright infringement. To this end, the copyright statute provides that
"all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright.., are governed exclusively by this title." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). Thus, when state law
provides a right equivalent to that granted by the copyright statute, the state law claim is preempted by
federal copyright law. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that federal copyright law preempts state causes of action, but that "if an 'extra element' is
'required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, in
order to constitute a state-created cause of action, then the right does not lie "within the general scope of
copyright," and there is no preemption-"' (citation omitted)).
76. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1323.
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). This section of the Copyright Act "permits an individual in rightful
possession of a copy of a work to undertake necessary efforts to understand the work's ideas, processes,
and methods of operation." Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir-
1992). The Federal Circuit held that reverse engineering of software fell within the provisions of 17
U.S.C. § 107 in this case. Id. at 843.
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was not preempted and, more important to the issue at hand, that Baystate
had waived its fair use defense by agreeing to the terms of the contract. 79
The majority in the Federal Circuit held that Bowers's breach of con-
tract claim was not preempted by federal copyright law.80 Specifically, the
court held that "private parties are free to contractually forego the limited
ability to reverse engineer a software product under the exemptions of the
Copyright Act."'81 This conclusion was largely a result of the majority fa-
voring "freedom of contract." 82 The court reasoned that other courts had
"found that the mutual assent and consideration required by a contract
claim render that claim qualitatively different from copyright infringe-
ment."'83 Despite this reliance on the element of mutual assent to differenti-
ate contract claims from copyright claims, the majority did not discuss
whether contracts of adhesion, such as the shrinkwrap license agreement at
issue, should be enforced as readily as freely and mutually negotiated con-
tracts. By simply assuming the contract was valid, the Federal Circuit had
no choice but to hold that Baystate had waived its copyright fair use de-
fense and had breached the contract.
Instrumental to Judge Dyk's argument in his partial dissent in this case
was that the contract at issue was adhesive. 84 He went so far as to suggest
that any contract of adhesion purporting to prohibit the adherent from en-
gaging in conduct permitted under the fair use exception, an extremely
important portion of the copyright statute, should be preempted by copy-
right law. 85
III. PUBLIC POLICIES SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CASES
In deciding whether to enforce a contract in any intellectual property
context, courts must not lose sight of the policy objectives sought to be
advanced by the intellectual property statutory scheme in question. These
policies can help inform the court as it applies any test of contract validity.
79. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1323.
80. Id. at 1325-26.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1323.
83. Id. at 1325 (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996)).
84. Id. at 1337-38 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 1337.
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A. Patent Law
The United States patent system is designed to balance "the need to
encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle compe-
tition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and
useful Arts.' 86 To this end, the patent system seeks to encourage new in-
ventions that substantially advance the state of the art by granting to inven-
tors "for limited Times... the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries." 87
The monopoly thus granted is thought to encourage large advances in tech-
nology by providing inventors an incentive to invest time and resources in
developing those "things which are worth to the public the embarrassment
of an exclusive patent." 88 This is balanced by the requirement that an in-
vention be truly new; patents may not be issued "whose effects are to re-
move existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
to materials already available." 89
Besides encouraging significant inventions that greatly advance the
state of the art, patent law is also designed to encourage "refinement
through imitation." 90 Because constant innovation requires innovators to
make small improvements to existing technology, innovators must have
access to knowledge about the state of the art and must be made aware of
the boundaries of technology owned by patent holders. These needs are the
source of the patent law requirement that applicants include in their appli-
cation an enabling disclosure of their invention,91 as well as of the require-
ment that patents include a list of claims delineating the subject matter
regarded as the inventor's invention. 92 Strict enforcement of the disclosure
and claiming requirements allows later innovators to design around the
patent and thereby refine the technology.
Thus, there are three policies sought to be advanced in patent law.
First, the store of knowledge available to the public is not to be diminished
86. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
88. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148 (quoting 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Me-
morial ed. 1903)).
89. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
90. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
91 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). In this context, "enabling disclosure" means that the inventor must
describe "the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use [it]." Id. The concept also includes the requirement that the inventor dis-
close "the best mode contemplated ... of carrying out his invention." Id.
92. Id.
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(and, indeed, should be enhanced). Second, the system is meant to encour-
age significant inventions that greatly advance the state of the art. Third,
the system encourages innovations that are based upon and that design
around prior pioneering inventions.
B. Copyright Law
The constitutional basis for copyright law lies in the same clause as
that providing the basis for patent law.93 Thus, it is unsurprising that the
policies sought to be advanced by copyright law are similar to those sought
to be advanced by patent law. The focus for authors is on the copyright
incentive: "secur[ing] a fair return for [their] creative labor."'94 However,
"the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good."'95 The incentive provided to authors to create works
in the interest of "the general public good"96 is analogous to the incentive
provided in patent law to inventors to invent new and useful devices in the
interest of promoting "the Progress of ... useful Arts."'97
As with patent law, though, initial creativity is not the sole aim of the
copyright system. Copyright law also seeks to foster "secondary creativ-
ity," or creativity based on existing works of authorship.98 This is similar to
the goal in patent law of encouraging design-around behavior, or innova-
tion based on existing patents. 99 Secondary creativity is protected in copy-
right law at least in part by the doctrine of fair use, which helps ensure that
the copyright monopoly protects only the expression of an idea, not the
underlying idea itself.100 It does so by allowing practices like reverse engi-
neering of software, permitting owners of copies of the software to exam-
ine the product, determine the unprotectable ideas behind it, and "design
around" the software to create their own expressions combining those
ideas. 01
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In copyright law, the clause's references to authors and their
writings are the operative terms, as opposed to the references to inventors and their discoveries, which
apply to patent law.
94. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
95- Id.
96. Id.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
98. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109-
10(1990).
99. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
100. Leval, supra note 98, at 1109-10. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107, which provides for fair use,
defining it as use "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multi-
ple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
101. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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There are thus two major policies sought to be advanced by copyright
law. First, the copyright statutory scheme provides an incentive to authors
to create new works, expressing ideas in creative new ways. Second, copy-
right law encourages secondary creativity, allowing authors to build on the
prior creativity of others.
IV. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DECIDING WHETHER TO ENFORCE
CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
It is clear from the dissents in both Bowers and Monsanto that there is
room for disagreement with the Federal Circuit's decisions. It is not imme-
diately clear to an impartial observer whether the majority or the dissent in
either case ultimately came to the correct decision. What does seem clear is
that the majority in both cases failed to give proper consideration to any of
the factors previously considered by other courts or suggested by commen-
tators for deciding whether an adhesive contract should be enforced. In
Monsanto, the majority's analysis was limited to the question of whether
the defendant signed the agreement in question. 102 Implicit in this analysis
was the assumption that any contract agreed to is enforceable, regardless of
its other characteristics. The majority's analysis in Bowers was similar.
There, the questions asked included whether it was permissible under copy-
right law for a party to waive its fair use protection 10 3 and whether the
terms of the contract at issue did in fact waive that protection. 104 The ma-
jority reasoned that, as long as copyright law permitted the contractual
provision at issue, the term was enforceable; they never asked whether the
adhesive nature of the contract affected its enforceability.
The reasoning followed by the Federal Circuit in these two cases sug-
gests an increasing formalism with respect to contract claims. 10 5 If these
cases are followed in the future, the judicial inquiry will be limited to ask-
ing whether a contract existed and perhaps, though not necessarily, what
the terms of the contract were. The fact that a contract may conflict with
other important public policies, such as personal jurisdiction rules or the
copyright fair use exception, means nothing in this inquiry. The fact that a
102. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1232, 123 S. Ct. 1357 (2003).
103. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539
U.S. 928, 123 . Ct. 2588 (2003).
104. Id. at 1326.
105. This result may not be surprising in light of the Federal Circuit's move away from standards
"based upon 'all the facts and circumstances' and toward "simple rules." Thomas, supra note 19, at
773.
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particular contract exhibits problems with mutual assent, as is the case for
adhesive contracts, is similarly unimportant. The Federal Circuit should
depart from this course and should adopt a test that properly balances all
relevant factors and seeks conclusions that are fair as well as predictable.
The proper test to be used is one in which the mere presence of some-
thing called a contract by one party is not by itself determinative. The test
should take into account the policies and approaches discussed above.
A. Factors from Case Law
As was discussed above, many courts deal with standard form con-
tracts by examining the situation for fundamental fairness and by attempt-
ing to balance the equities of the case. 106 Some courts simply examine
contracts much more closely when dealing with standardized forms. 107
Others look more carefully at contracts drafted by those with a great deal of
bargaining power.108 Still others, when analyzing a form contract, shift the
burden of proof of contract validity, requiring the drafting party to prove
validity, rather than requiring the adherent to prove invalidity.109 These
approaches are all concerned with equity, refusing to enforce a contract,
even when mechanical application of contract law rules would demand
enforcement, when doing so would be fundamentally unfair to the adhering
party.
In addition to these approaches taken by state courts, the United States
Supreme Court offered some guidance in Carnival Cruise Lines for dealing
with contracts of adhesion, particularly when those contracts include forum
selection clauses.1 10 Clauses that seem inequitable to the adhering party
may be considered valid when (1) the drafting party has a legitimate inter-
est in the clause being applied, and (2) both parties benefit to some extent
from the application of the clause, either through lower litigation expenses
or through lower prices, or both."l
Finally, at least with respect to ambiguous contract terms, many
courts, including the Federal Circuit, have applied the doctrine of contra
106. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
107. C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975) (en bane).
108. Ellsworth Dobbs Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967).
109. Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971).
110. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
111. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991).
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proferentum to form contracts drafted by one party and offered on a "take it
or leave it" basis." 12
Thus, case law provides courts considering contracts of adhesion with
several factors to consider in deciding whether to enforce a term. First,
courts should examine whether enforcing the term furthers a legitimate
interest of the party drafting the contract. Second, it should be determined
whether enforcing the term at issue provides some benefit to both parties to
the transaction. Third, many courts have adopted a broad attitude that form
contracts are not presumptively valid and that enforcing terms of these
agreements depends on a showing that doing so is equitable. Finally, when
a form contract contains an ambiguous term, the term should be construed
against the interests of the party drafting the contract.
B. Factors from Policy
In analyzing contracts of adhesion in intellectual property cases,
courts should not lose sight of how the particular transaction in question
and the terms of the contract at issue advance or retard appropriate innova-
tion and creation policies. The particular policies important in a given case
depend on whether the case sounds in patent law or copyright law.
Of the three policies sought to be advanced in patent law, only the pol-
icy of encouraging large and novel advances in the state of the art is always
important in the context of contract enforcement. The policy of ensuring
that knowledge is not removed from the public domain is rarely implicated
in contract cases. Likewise, the policy of encouraging small improvements
based on existing patents is generally not affected by courts' decisions as to
whether to enforce contracts of adhesion.' 1 3
With respect to relevant patent policy, the patent statutory system
seeks to encourage large advances in the state of the art by providing inven-
tors with an incentive to invent, in the form of a right to exclude others
from nearly any use of their invention. This policy is advanced by strict
enforcement of contractual terms when they are drafted by the patentee,
since any limit on the ability of a patentee to make commercial use of his
invention lessens the value of his exclusive rights and reduces the invention
112. Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
113. It is possible to imagine a case in which this last policy might be implicated. In a case similar
to Bowers, where the product was protected by a patent rather than a copyright and where an adhesive
licensing agreement required the licensee not to engage in any design-around behavior or required the
licensee to assign to the patentee all products developed as a result of designing around the product at
issue, courts would need to take into account the patent law policy of encouraging design-around be-
havior when deciding whether to enforce the license agreement.
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incentive. This factor can therefore militate either in favor of or against
enforcement, depending on which party-the patentee or his licensee-
drafted the contract in question.
If the contract at issue deals with matters of copyright law rather than
patent law, a similar analysis is possible. As with patent law, copyright law
seeks to encourage both primary creativity and secondary creativity. Pri-
mary creativity is more strongly encouraged when copyright holders are
allowed to dictate their own licensing terms, since this increases the value
of the exclusive rights the author is granted in exchange for making his
work public. Thus, copyright policy can argue for strict enforcement of
contract terms when they are drafted by the copyright holder.
However, there is one major difference between copyright law and
patent law. Whereas patents protect ideas, copyrights protect only expres-
sions of ideas, not ideas themselves.1 14 As explained above, the doctrine of
fair use is an important part of the statutory scheme that preserves this di-
chotomy and encourages secondary creativity. l l5 Thus, when a copyright
holder drafts its contract terms in such a way as to undermine the principles
of fair use, copyright policy strongly militates against enforcing the terms
of the contract at issue.
C. Other Factors
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognized that
standardized form contracts presented problems not present when parties
freely bargain over the terms of their agreement. 116 This led to the adoption
of a statement that "[w]here the [drafting] party has reason to believe that
the party manifesting [assent to a standard form contract] would not do so
if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part
of the agreement."' 117 As explained in comment f to section 211, this state-
ment means that terms to which the adherent would not reasonably agree
are stricken from the agreement, regardless of whether the adherent actu-
ally agreed to the terms. 1 18 This suggests that courts should use a reason-
able adherent standard; when a term is unreasonable in light of the nature
of the agreement, it should not be enforced.
114. Leval, supra note 98, at 1109-10.
115. Id.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 emt. c (1981).
117. Id. § 211(3).
118. Id. § 211 cmt. f.
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In addition to this factor from the Restatement, two other factors likely
should be considered when courts decide whether the terms of a contract of
adhesion will be enforced against the adherent. First, courts should con-
sider the type of goods or services for which the parties are contracting.
Terms should be enforced more readily when the goods or services are
luxury items than when they are relative necessities, since a seller has an
easier time imposing adverse terms upon a buyer who must make the pur-
chase than she does imposing the same terms upon a buyer who can opt to
walk away. 1' 9 Thus, when adherents purchase cruise tickets, a luxury
item, 120 the terms of the purchase contract need not be scrutinized terribly
closely. However, when a farmer buys genetically modified soybeans nec-
essary to compete in the soybean market, 12 1 the contract at least merits a
critical judicial inspection.
One final factor to be considered is the availability of other sources for
the goods or services in question. When the party drafting the contract is
the only source for the product, he is likely to be able to impose terms more
readily on adherents than would be the case were he only one of many
sources. 122 Thus, to use the same example as above, the soybean contract,
where the product is sold by a party who has a monopoly as a result of his
patent, 123 merits stricter analysis than the cruise ticket, where many sellers
compete for the business of cruise passengers. 124
V. APPLYING THE FACTORS TO MONSANTO AND BOWERS
Having identified the factors that courts should consider when decid-
ing whether to enforce contracts of adhesion in intellectual property cases,
the next step is to apply those factors to the two cases considered in this
Note, Monsanto Co. v. McFarling and Bowers v. Baystate Technologies. It
will be demonstrated that the Federal Circuit's analysis in both cases was
not only overly simplistic and formalist but also reached the incorrect result
each time. In both cases, the court should have declined to enforce the con-
119. Monsanto Co. v. MeFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Clevenger, J., dissenting)
("Courts are more likely to label a contract adhesive when ... the purchaser has no other practical
source to turn for necessary goods, for th[is] factor[] tend[s] to erode the premise that the rights given
up by the lesser party were surrendered freely and fairly."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1232, 123 S. Ct. 1357
(2003).
120. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587 (1991).
121. Monsanto, 302 F.3dat 1301 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
122. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Competition among ven-
dors ... is how consumers are protected in a market economy.").
123. Monsanto, 302 F.3dat 1293.
124. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593.
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tract terms at issue. Although the court reached the wrong result both times,
it is important to note that reaching the incorrect result is less important in
this context than the court's complete lack of any meaningful analysis.
As discussed above, 125 there are several factors to be considered when
determining whether a questionable provision contained in a form contract
should be enforced. First, the nature of the goods or services contracted for
must be considered, as must the available sources of those goods or ser-
vices. Second, courts should consider the reasonableness of the terms of the
contract in light of the goods or services in question. Third, the court
should ask whether enforcing the terms of the form contract furthers a le-
gitimate interest of the party drafting the contract and whether doing so
provides some benefit to both parties to the transaction, including the ad-
herent. Fourth, when a form contract contains an ambiguous term, the term
should be construed against the interests of the party drafting the contract.
Finally, in the intellectual property context, relevant policies sought to be
advanced by intellectual property laws should be taken into account. In
general, courts should not simply presume that form contracts are valid and
should engage in this factor-based analysis in order to ensure that enforcing
the questionable terms of the contract of adhesion in question is equitable.
A. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling
In Monsanto, the goods in question were soybean seeds genetically
modified to be resistant to glyphosphate-based herbicides.1 26 Mr. McFar-
ling, as a soybean farmer, presumably required some soybean seeds in or-
der to conduct his business, although it is something of an open question
whether he required glyphosphate-resistant soybeans. There was testimony
at the district court stage of the litigation that tended to show that farmers
who planted the genetically modified soybeans were more competitive than
those who did not. 127 Sixty-six percent of American soybeans currently
planted carry the genetic modifications developed and patented by Mon-
santo, 128 and the particular part of Mississippi where Mr. McFarling farmed
required the use of glyphosphate herbicides, which are much more cost-
effective when used with glyphosphate-resistant crops. 129 Taken together,
this all shows that the soybeans for which the parties contracted were a
125. See supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.
126. Monsanto, 302 F.3d at 1293.
127. Id. at 1301 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
128- Id-
129. Id.
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necessary good. This factor argues against enforcing the form contract
against the adherent, since the seller of a necessary good is more likely to
be able to impose unfavorable terms on the buyer than is the seller of a
luxury item.
In addition, the genetically modified soybeans at issue are only avail-
able from Monsanto. The company developed the glyphosphate-resistant
plants and holds two United States patents on the technology. 130 As such,
Monsanto has a monopoly (albeit "an entirely lawful one"'131) on the goods
at issue in this case. While it is reasonable to allow a patentee to impose
conditions on the sale of its patented goods, the patentee is more likely to
be able to impose adverse conditions on the purchaser, so those conditions
should be subject to greater scrutiny for fairness. Since Monsanto is in such
a position, terms in a form contract that it drafts should be subject to a high
degree of scrutiny. Were this factor the only one in play, it would not be
enough to prevent enforcement of the contract terms at issue. It should,
however, subject the contract to more analysis. The presence of Mon-
santo's monopoly in genetically modified soybeans, together with other
factors that argue against enforcing the contract's terms, should make
courts more hesitant to enforce contracts like this one. Thus, this factor
does not support enforcing the contract's forum selection clause.
The next factor asks courts to inquire into the reasonableness of the
terms of the form contract at issue. Here, the contract required the adherent
to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division. 132 As pointed out by
Judge Clevenger in dissent, when forum selection clauses are wielded of-
fensively, 133 they are inherently less reasonable than when they are wielded
defensively. 134 Here, Monsanto used the forum selection clause offen-
sively. 135 As Judge Clevenger pointed out in dissent, patentees, as with all
civil plaintiffs, have generally been expected to bear the cost of initiating
litigation in the accused infringer's home forum. 136 Given the relative posi-
130. Id. at 1293.
131. Id. at 1301 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1294-
133. Offensive forum selection clauses are those that are used by the contract drafter when he is a
plaintiff to force the contract adherent, as a defendant, into a particular forum. See id. at 1304.
134. Defensive forum selection clauses are those that are used by the contract drafter to defend
himself against being brought into foreign fora when suit is brought against him by the contract adher-
ent. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. ("[H]eretofore the burden of initiating infringement litigation where the infringer resides
has been accepted as another cost attendant to enjoyment of the patent right.").
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tions of the parties in this case, the offensive forum selection clause is at
least somewhat unreasonable, and this factor argues against enforcing the
form contract (or at least the forum selection clause).
Another factor to consider in Monsanto is whether the terms of the
form contract at issue provide benefits to both parties and serve a legitimate
interest of the drafting party. Of particular interest here is the forum selec-
tion clause. The Supreme Court discussed possible legitimate interests for
including forum selection clauses in form contracts in Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute; these include (1) a legitimate interest on the part of the
cruise line "in limiting the fora" in which it could be sued, (2) an interest
on the part of both parties to the agreement in reducing the cost of litigation
by "dispelling any confusion about where" suit may be brought, and (3) the
fact that lower litigation costs were passed on to passengers in the form of
lower ticket prices. 137 However, as discussed by Judge Clevenger in his
dissent, none of the rationales for forum selection clauses discussed in that
case applied to the Monsanto case. 138 First, the offensive use of the forum
selection clause, discussed above, suggests that Monsanto does not have
the legitimate interest "in not being carried off to the myriad home fora of
its [customers]" that allowed the forum selection clause to stand in Carni-
val Cruise Lines.139 Monsanto would only make use of its forum selection
clause as a plaintiff, not a defendant. 140
Nor does this forum selection clause provide the "salutary effect[s]"
discussed by the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines. 141 As the Court
pointed out, clauses providing for trial of issues in a particular forum may
decrease the cost of litigation by resolving ex ante matters of forum selec-
tion and choice of law. 142 This lower litigation cost is passed on to the cus-
tomers of the party drafting the contract. As Judge Clevenger noted,
though, there is little reason to expect patentees to pass on the lower costs
of doing business to their customers. 143 The holder of a patent has a mo-
nopoly in the patented goods, and he therefore is most likely to "set [his]
prices based on consumer demand and not on the cost of production."' 144
Therefore, the element of the legitimate interest/benefits factor that de-
137. See supra notes 30-31.
138. Monsanto, 302 F.3d at 1305-06 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1305.
140. Id.
141. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991).
142. Id.
143. Monsanto, 302 F.3d at 1306 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
mands that both parties benefit at least to some extent from the terms of the
form contract at issue is missing in Monsanto. This factor weighs against
enforcing the forum selection clause in the contract.
The next factor incorporates the principle of contra proferentum,
whereby any ambiguous terms of the form contract are construed against
the interests of the party who drafted the contract. As discussed above, this
puts the burden of avoiding ambiguity on the person who is most able to do
so by properly drafting the contract in the first place. In Monsanto, though,
there is no suggestion that any of the contractual terms at issue are ambigu-
ous. Thus, this factor does not weigh strongly in favor of either party.
The final factor to be applied in determining whether a form contract
should be enforced is drawn from relevant intellectual property policy. In
Monsanto, the policy to be considered is that sought to be advanced by the
patent system. As discussed above, the patent system seeks to encourage
innovation by offering inventors an incentive to take large steps forward in
the state of the art; this incentive is strongest when patentees are allowed to
license their technology on the terms that benefit them most. Therefore, this
factor always militates in favor of enforcing a form contract that is drafted
by a patentee to license his invention. In Monsanto, this factor weighs in
favor of enforcing the contract of adhesion.
Thus, the policy factor is in favor of enforcing the contract in Mon-
santo. Although the intellectual property policy factor is probably the most
important of the factors discussed, 145 it should not be the only considera-
tion in a court's analysis. Enforcement of contracts, particularly those
drafted by one party and offered to the other on a "take it or leave it" basis,
especially when those contracts include questionable terms, should only
take place after a careful analysis like the one undertaken here. The am-
biguous terms factor is neither in favor of nor against enforcing the con-
tract. All the other factors-the nature of goods factor, the available
sources of goods factor, the reasonableness of terms factor, and the legiti-
mate interests/benefits factor-argue against enforcing the form contract.
Here, although the most important factor, that of intellectual property pol-
icy, does suggest that the forum selection clause should have been en-
forced, no other factor supports that conclusion. Through failing to engage
in any analysis, the Federal Circuit came to the wrong result in Monsanto
145. This is especially true given the Congressional purpose in creating the Federal Circuit: to
establish "a forum for appeals from throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress deter-
mines that there is special need for national uniformity." S. REP. No. 97-275, at 4 (1981), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14.
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with respect to the contract enforcement issue. Again, while the incorrect
result shows a shortcoming of the Federal Circuit's extremely limited
analysis, the result itself is less important than the fact that the Federal Cir-
cuit reached that result through a faulty-or even nonexistent-analysis.
B. Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.
In Bowers, the goods contracted for were computer software, specifi-
cally software designed to help draftspersons create drawings that comply
with industry standards. 146 Baystate Technologies competed with Bowers
and manufactured its own similar software, Draft-Pak. 147 Acquiring Bow-
ers's software was not necessary in order for Baystate to do business. Al-
though doing so saved Baystate the trouble of independently developing
software from scratch, it did incur the cost of what was undoubtedly a sig-
nificant reverse engineering effort. This situation is different from that in
Monsanto, where the seeds at issue were almost an absolute necessity for
McFarling's business. This factor is an important consideration because it
gets at the relative bargaining power of the parties to the contract under
consideration. Since the goods were not terribly necessary to Baystate's
business, Bowers did not wield as much bargaining power as he otherwise
might have. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the adherent,
Baystate Technologies, was a corporation presumably experienced in
commercial negotiations. Had avoiding adverse contract terms been impor-
tant to Baystate, it could have forgone the purchase altogether or purchased
the software after negotiating more favorable terms with Bowers. Since
Baystate chose not to do so, the nature of the goods factor weighs in Bow-
ers's favor and militates for enforcing the shrinkwrap license agreement.
It is unclear from the facts presented in Bowers whether there were
other sources from which Baystate Technologies could have acquired soft-
ware to reverse engineer in order to develop its product. No other similar
products are mentioned in the Federal Circuit's opinion, and it is impossi-
ble to know whether any substitute products were available. As with the
previous factor, this factor is important in order to determine whether the
contract drafter wielded an undue amount of bargaining power over the
adherent-an adherent who must purchase the goods in question, if at all,
from the contract drafter has little choice but to accept the offered terms.
Here, there is simply not enough information to determine whether other
146. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539
U.S. 928, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003).
147. Id. at 1322.
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sources of software were available to Baystate Technologies. Thus, the
other available sources factor must be considered neutral.
Next, the court should have examined the reasonableness of the con-
tract term at issue. In Bowers, the challenged contractual term was one that
prohibited copying the software for purposes of reverse engineering.' 48 As
discussed above, the Federal Circuit has held that reverse engineering falls
within the scope of copyright fair use. 149 As such, the reasonableness of the
term implicates the issue of promotion of relevant intellectual property
public policy, which is discussed as its own factor below. This limits how
useful the reasonableness inquiry can be when considered by itself. Still,
without bringing up the potential prohibition copyright law places on such
a contract term, a term prohibiting copying of a product that can be easily
copied, particularly when that copying is done for the purpose of compet-
ing with the original author, seems reasonable. This factor therefore weighs
in favor of enforcing the contract.
In part, the reason that enforcing a term like the one at issue here
seems reasonable is that doing so furthers a legitimate interest of the person
who drafted the contract, Bowers. Although relevant copyright policy may
not protect it,150 Bowers certainly has a reasonable interest in ensuring his
competitors are not allowed to free ride on the effort he put into developing
his product. It is questionable, though, whether enforcing the term prohibit-
ing reverse engineering provides any benefit to Baystate Technologies. In
the discussion of forum selection clauses above, potential benefits to con-
tract adherents of enforcing the clauses included lower product prices and
lower litigation expenses. 151 No such effect is apparent here, however. The
prohibition on reverse engineering does not make any issue during litiga-
tion more certain. Rather, the contract term at issue is just like any other
term-it is an issue to be litigated and therefore increases the duration and
expense of a lawsuit. Because there are no lower litigation expenses for
Bowers, the contract drafter, there is no cost savings for him to pass on to
his customers. Enforcing the term prohibiting reverse engineering may
slightly reduce demand for Bowers's product (by discouraging those few
customers who only want to reverse engineer the product from buying it).
148. Id. at 1326.
149. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
150. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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This lowered consumer demand may lead to slightly lower prices, 152 but
the value of the product to customers is also reduced. Since there is no
benefit to contract adherents to be gained by enforcing the anti-reverse
engineering term, the adherent benefit factor weighs against enforcing the
term in this case.
The next factor to be considered regards the application of contra pro-
ferentum-any ambiguous contract terms should have been construed
against the interests of Bowers, the party who drafted the contract, placing
the burden of avoiding ambiguity on the person who is most able to do so
by properly drafting the contract in the first place. As in Monsanto, though,
there is no suggestion here that any of the contractual terms at issue are
ambiguous. Thus, this factor does not weigh strongly in favor of either
party.
Finally, the court in Bowers should have considered how the anti-
reverse engineering contract term advanced or retarded relevant intellectual
property policy. Here, the relevant policies are those of copyright law. As
in patent law, primary creativity is more strongly encouraged when copy-
right holders are allowed to dictate their own licensing terms, since this
increases the value of the author's exclusive rights. This suggests that
copyright policy argues for strict enforcement of contract terms, especially
when they are drafted by the copyright holder. However, whereas patents
are sometimes thought of as protecting ideas, copyrights are clearly in-
tended to protect only expressions of ideas, not the underlying ideas them-
selves. As explained above, the doctrine of fair use is an important part of
the statutory scheme that preserves this dichotomy and encourages secon-
dary creativity. Thus, when a copyright holder contracts in such a way as to
undermine the principles of fair use, copyright policy strongly militates
against enforcing the contract. This is exactly what Bowers's shrinkwrap
license agreement tried to do. The terms of the license agreement prohib-
ited reverse engineering, 153 which several circuit courts of appeals have
held to fall within the scope of copyright fair use. 154 Clearly, the copyright
policy factor argues strongly against enforcing this term under the circum-
stances in this case.
152. Even this effect is questionable, since, with fewer copies of the software sold, each must bear
a greater portion of a constant development cost, which would lead to higher prices. The point is that
any benefit to an adherent from a clause like this one, to the extent that any benefit even exists, is small.
153. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326.
154. Id. at 1336 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Bateman v. Mnemonics,
Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (lth Cir. 1996); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp., 975 F.2d at 843).
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Applying all of the factors to Bowers, the nature of the goods factor
argues for enforcing the contract, the other available sources factor is neu-
tral, the reasonableness factor generally supports enforcement, the legiti-
mate interest of Bowers argues for enforcing the license agreement, the
lack of any benefit to Baystate Technologies militates against enforcement,
the principle of contra proferentum argues neither way, and copyright pol-
icy weighs strongly against enforcing the agreement. There are three fac-
tors in support of enforcing the anti-reverse engineering provision, and
there are two factors against such enforcement.
This case presents almost a mirror image of Monsanto, since the intel-
lectual property policy factor stands nearly alone against several other fac-
tors. However, as discussed above, the intellectual property policy factor is
always the most important of the factors, particularly given the Federal
Circuit's mandate to provide some uniformity in intellectual property law.
Thus, this factor should receive more weight than the others. In addition,
the factors arguing in support of enforcement here are relatively weak in
light of the strong statutory statement in favor of preserving the right to
reverse engineer software. The contract term prohibiting reverse engineer-
ing is reasonable and preserves a legitimate interest of the contract drafter
only when we consider it in the absence of the fair use provisions of the
Copyright Act. While the term is objectively reasonable and preserves an
interest that any contract drafter in Bowers's situation would seek to pre-
serve, Congress has determined that the interest at issue is not legitimate
and that a term preserving it cannot be reasonable. This effectively elimi-
nates two of the three factors that argue for enforcement of the questionable
provision in Bowers. Thus, the factors, when properly weighed, suggest
that the anti-reverse engineering provision of the contract should not have
been enforced. As in Monsanto, the Federal Circuit reached the wrong
conclusion. Again, the fact that the court came up with the wrong answer is
less important than the court's failure to engage in any meaningful analysis.
VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF ADOPTING THE FACTOR-BASED APPROACH
The Federal Circuit's approach to resolving cases has been labeled
formalist by many commentators. 155 In large part, these commentators have
criticized the formalist approach for relying too heavily on simple, bright-
line rules, placing predictability and certainty of decisions above any other
155. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 19, at 1; Thomas, supra note 19, at 774.
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consideration, including fundamental fairness. 156 The approach of the Fed-
eral Circuit to contracts of adhesion, while of more recent vintage than
many of the tendencies commentators have criticized, is no less formalistic.
As such, it suffers from many of the same drawbacks as those tendencies.
There is always a tension between predictability of judicial decision
making and the degree to which judges may consider factors that influence
the fairness of a case's outcome. 157 Partly as a result of its mandate to bring
greater uniformity to patent law, the Federal Circuit has always favored
certainty and predictability when it has been forced to choose between
those aims and other important goals.15 8
The approach to contracts exhibited in Monsanto and Bowers is
wholly consistent with a jurisprudence that elevates bright-line rules to the
status of supreme and inviolable principles of law. Form contracts and
other contracts of adhesion are often enforceable. However, the Federal
Circuit does not even bother to question whether a given agreement should
be enforced-the statement that contracts are usually enforceable is enough
to convince the court that contracts are always enforceable, as long as they
meet certain formal requirements. In cases like Monsanto and Bowers, this
approach leads to incorrect results: as contracts of adhesion the agreements
at issue are worthy of more in-depth analysis and the agreements are either
markedly unfair (in the case of Monsanto) or in tension with important
policy (as in Bowers).
As has been stated, the incorrect results in these two cases are not ter-
ribly important in and of themselves. They do serve, though, to establish
one danger of the Federal Circuit's cavalier and overly formalistic ap-
proach to issues such as contract enforcement. Adopting the factor-based
approach articulated in this Note would allow the Federal Circuit to take an
approach that preserves fundamental fairness by taking into account factors
relevant to the contract at issue. It is conceivable that such an approach
would lead to a small decrease in the predictability and certainty that are
ensured by taking a very formalistic approach to judicial analysis. How-
ever, this decrease in predictability should be acceptable given the consid-
erable increase in the likelihood of fair decisions that would result from
adopting the recommended approach.
Even a slight drop in the predictability of contract enforcement in
cases that might go to the Federal Circuit could be compensated for by
156. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 20, at 1.
157. Id.
158. Holbrook, supra note 19, at 1.
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those who draft contracts by which intellectual property is licensed. It is
true that the Federal Circuit currently takes an approach under which nearly
all contracts are enforced and that, under the proposed approach, contracts
like those in Monsanto and Bowers would not be enforced. However, intel-
lectual property owners could ensure that their entire agreement is enforced
by making sure that the agreement does not contain terms that violate rele-
vant intellectual property policy or that are otherwise questionable in light
of facts showing that the contract drafter has much greater bargaining
power than the adherent. When form contracts are used that violate either
of these precepts, the contract drafter risks having the court refuse to en-
force the questionable provisions.
CONCLUSION
Many commentators have criticized the Federal Circuit's approach to
resolving cases, particularly its reliance on bright-line rules, as overly for-
malistic. This approach extends to the court's treatment of contracts of
adhesion, which ignores any factor other than the presence of a document
the court can label a contract. This approach has already led the court to
decide incorrectly in two cases, which graphically demonstrates the weak-
ness of this form of analysis. The Federal Circuit should adopt the test de-
scribed above, deciding whether to enforce contracts of adhesion based on
factors including the type of goods or services being contracted for, the
availability of alternative sources for the goods or services, the reasonable-
ness of the contract terms, the legitimate interests of and benefits to the
contracting parties, and particularly the degree to which enforcement of the
contract advances relevant public policy. Doing so will ensure that the Fed-
eral Circuit properly balances predictability and fundamental fairness when
evaluating contracts of adhesion.
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